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Terrence Boyle’s Record on Disability Issues

To refer others to this page, please use:
http://www.nad.org/boylerecord

This background on Terrence Boyle’s Record has been written by the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law.

Terrence Boyle’s Nomination at a Glance

On May 9, 2001, President Bush nominated Terrence Boyle to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Fourth Circuit is comprised of North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia and Maryland. 

Boyle currently sits on the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. Ronald Reagan appointed Boyle to the seat in 1984.

Judge Boyle was nominated to the Fourth Circuit based on the recommendation of former Senator Jesse Helms. Helms has supported Boyle’s elevation to the Fourth Circuit for years and convinced the first President Bush to nominate Boyle to the Fourth Circuit in 1991. However, Boyle was never confirmed and his nomination lapsed at the end of 1992. 

Boyle has consistently ruled against individuals with disabilities in cases brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504. Many of his decisions are based on radical interpretations of disability rights laws, which are often completely inconsistent with basic disability law as interpreted by other courts and federal enforcement agencies and as expressed in the statutes and regulations.

Boyle Has Ruled to Limit Congress’ Power to Enforce the ADA

Boyle ruled that Congress had no authority to make Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) applicable to the states.

In Brown v. North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles, 987 F. Supp. 451 (E.D.N.C. 1997), individuals with disabilities challenged the fee imposed for handicapped parking placards. Boyle held that the state defendant could not be sued because it had sovereign immunity—four years before the Supreme Court’s Garrett decision,[1] which held that states could not be sued under Title I of the ADA.

 Boyle ruled that Congress exceeded its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when it made the ADA applicable to the states. Boyle’s opinion is worded broadly and seemingly would apply to all of Title II and possibly the entire ADA. He reached this sweeping conclusion based on a conclusory analysis.

 First, he ruled that Congress had improperly tried to change the constitutional standard for evaluating discrimination against individuals with disabilities by finding that individuals with disabilities were a “discrete and insular minority.” Id. at 457-58. Based on that, Boyle’s opinion argued, Congress had exceeded its power in applying the ADA to the states. Id. at 458.

 Boyle then ruled that the ADA is not remedial legislation in the same sense as other anti-discrimination statutes because it does not treat people equally but instead “seeks to single out the disabled for special, advantageous treatment.” His decision asserted that the ADA demands entitlement, which “has little to do with promoting the ‘equal protection of the laws.’” Id. Therefore, he ruled that the ADA – or at least Title II – was not proper legislation under Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment power. Id. at 459.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed Boyle’s decision, but on much narrower ground, ruling that only the regulation prohibiting surcharges for reasonable accommodations was not justified as Fourteenth Amendment legislation based on the record presented to the court. Brown v. North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles, 166 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1190 (2001).

Boyle ruled that Congress had no power to apply the ADA to state prisons under either the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment.

 In one of the earliest decisions to deny individuals the right to enforce the ADA by applying federalism principles, Boyle dismissed a case brought by a state prison inmate that challenged the prison’s failure to make reasonable accommodations for his disability that would enable him to participate in a prison work program. Pierce v. King, 918 F. Supp. 932 (E.D.N.C. 1996).

 The program would have allowed the plaintiff to earn credits to reduce the length of his sentence. Boyle found that the ADA did not create a cause of action for state inmates “displeased with their prison work assignments.”  Id. at 938.

 Boyle ruled that Congress had no power under the Commerce Clause to apply the ADA to state prisons. Boyle ruled that the direct effects of states’ use of prison labor on interstate commerce were “wholly insubstantial within the context of our nation’s federalist traditions, to legitimate application of labor laws such as the ADA to state prisons.” Id. at 940. Boyle’s ruling appears to be the only published decision where a federal court invalidated part of the ADA as outside of Congress’s Commerce power.

 Boyle also held that the ADA was not valid Fourteenth Amendment legislation. He wrote:

 Although Congress invoked the power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment in passing the ADA, it is unclear what Fourteenth Amendment right, if any, is vindicated by the Act. The Fourteenth Amendment has traditionally been understood as protecting individuals from state action that would infringe upon individual liberties. The ADA, however, creates positive rights to entitlement against other individuals and state governments... Although framed in terms of addressing discrimination, the Act’s operative remedial provisions demand not equals treatment, but special treatment tailored to the claimed disability. In this respect, the ADA differs radically from traditional anti-discrimination laws, such as Title VII, which seek only a state of affairs where individuals are treated in a neutral manner without regard to race, sex, age, etc. Unlike traditional anti-discrimination laws, the ADA demands entitlement in order to achieve its goals. This the Fourteenth Amendment cannot authorize.

Id. at 940 (emphasis in original).

 Although the ruling was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit based on different reasoning, 131 F.3d 136 (4th Cir. (N.C.), Dec. 11, 1997), it was later vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court after a holding in Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998) that the ADA applies to state prisons. 

 Boyle has Ruled to Limit the Right to Reasonable Accommodation.

Boyle’s view of the right to reasonable accommodations under the ADA and Section 504 is contrary to the statute, regulations, and black letter disability law.

 In Williams v. Avnet, Inc., 910 F. Supp. 1124 (E.D.N.C. 1995), Boyle refused to let an ADA employment lawsuit proceed. The suit was brought by a manual punch press operator who sustained permanent injuries in a car accident. She was limited in lifting heavy objects and in heavy pushing and pulling. Upon her return to work, the woman requested the accommodation of a forklift to assist her in doing her job, or alternatively to be reassigned to another position in accordance with the employer’s policies. Instead, the employer terminated her.

 Boyle held that the requested accommodations were not reasonable. He wrote:

The meaning of ‘reasonable’ within an ADA accommodation context, as evidenced by the decisions of the Fourth Circuit, is grounded in deference to an employer’s expert business decision flowing from the assumption that people behave in an economically rational manner, and an understanding that the requirement of reason is a requirement of economic rationality.

 Id. at 1133.

 Boyle held that courts should not second-guess an employer’s decision about whether an accommodation is reasonable unless the accommodation is “obviously reasonable” or there is no serious dispute about its reasonableness. Id. He noted that if reasonableness were not determined from the employer’s point of view, the ADA would require courts to act improperly as legislators in making that determination. Id. Boyle also ruled that an employer’s financial ability cannot be considered in determining whether an accommodation is reasonable for that employer. Id. at 1134.

 Boyle then went on to reject the plaintiff’s proposed accommodations as “clearly unreasonable.” He ruled that the employer was not required to provide a forklift because the ADA does not require any accommodation that is “substantial.” Id. at 1134. He also said it would be unreasonable to require another employee to assist the plaintiff, even if the assistance was only required for 15 minutes a day. Id. at 1134-35. Finally, he ruled that it would be unreasonable for the employer to reassign the plaintiff to another position, even if its own policies required it to do so. Id. at 1135.

 Boyle’s statements about the ADA’s reasonable accommodation requirement are completely inconsistent with basic ADA law, and Boyle was severely criticized by the Fourth Circuit for his analysis in the case. While the Fourth Circuit ultimately affirmed the decision, the court observed that Boyle’s analysis of the law was misguided and wrong on a number of grounds.  Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Systems, Inc., 101 F.3d 346 (4th Cir. 1996).

Alternatively, Boyle ruled that the employee did not have a disability because she was not substantially limited in doing similar work. He based this decision on the fact that she subsequently performed similar work at a school cafeteria. Id. at 1133. The Fourth Circuit also criticized Boyle’s analysis of the plaintiff’s disability, and was particularly troubled by his suggestion that working is not a “major life activity.”

 Boyle Has Ruled to Reduce Medical Privacy

In Butler v. Burroughs Wellcome, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 90 (E.D.N.C. 1996), an employee brought a claim under the ADA alleging failure to reasonably accommodate her psychiatric disorder. The plaintiff alleged a history of physical and sexual abuse by relatives. She was diagnosed with “post traumatic stress disorder and severe depression, which led her to have problems dealing with men.” Id. at 91. During her deposition, the plaintiff objected to a question relating to her sex life and indicated she did not want to discuss any aspect of her marriage. Id. at 91. She then moved for a protective order on the basis that the line of questioning was in bad faith, intended to embarrass her, and irrelevant. Id. at 91-92.

 Boyle denied her motion and ruled that in an ADA case, “a plaintiff’s medical history is relevant in its entirety.” Id. at 92. He wrote that it would be impossible to answer basic questions about whether a plaintiff was foreclosed from similar employment due to a disability, whether a plaintiff was qualified, or what accommodations were required “without full and complete access to the plaintiff’s medical records.” Id.

Boyle’s ruling is inconsistent with the understanding of most courts that access to medical records should be limited to those records that are relevant and necessary to determine the questions at hand. His ruling would subject ADA plaintiffs to unfettered invasions of their privacy.

 Boyle is Responsible for Other Troubling Rulings in the Areas of Housing and Employment

Boyle issued a disturbing ruling in a disability case involving group homes, Oxford House v. City of Raleigh, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3705 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 26, 1999).  The City of Raleigh had adopted a spacing requirement that limited the number of “Supportive Housing Residences” in a particular geographic area. Individuals with disabilities moved into Oxford House, only to find that a transitional home for people with mental disabilities was located too near to Oxford House to meet the City’s spacing requirement. Oxford House asked the City to waive the spacing requirement. When the City refused, Oxford House filed a complaint asking the court to declare that the ordinance violated the Fair Housing Act, the ADA and the Constitution.

 The City then filed what it characterized as a “counterclaim,” asking the judge to declare that the ordinance was legal. Oxford House failed to answer the counterclaim, and a default judgment was entered.

 Oxford House then asked the judge to vacate the default judgment, which may be done for “good cause shown” under the federal rules. Boyle denied the request on the ground that Oxford House did not present a meritorious defense because the zoning rules do not discriminate against those protected by the ADA but discriminate in favor of such individuals. Id. at 8. Simultaneously, Boyle ruled for the city on the pleadings. The tenants of Oxford House were forced to move immediately as a result of the ruling.

 In another case, Boyle reversed the decision of a federal magistrate that would have permitted an ADA plaintiff to proceed to trial on her claim that she was denied a promotion based on her disability. Chamblee v. Hardy, No. 2:96-CV-9-BO(3), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18835 (E.D.N.C. May 1, 1996).

 Federal judges generally give great deference to the findings and conclusions of the magistrates who are frequently assigned to make initial rulings on cases. It is highly unusual for a federal judge to reverse a decision of a magistrate. In this case, Boyle granted summary judgment for the defendant and held that the plaintiff, who claimed she was denied a promotion to a receptionist position due to her mobility impairment, was not qualified for the job she sought. He said that she could not meet minimum attendance requirements because she was enrolled in a nursing class that would conflict with the regular job hours required of a receptionist. Boyle completely disregarded the magistrate’s findings that the employer had presented no evidence that he had told the plaintiff about the attendance requirements, and that she might well have chosen to stop attending school if she knew that her schooling would prevent her from getting the job.

 Boyle also based his ruling on his conclusion that plaintiff the applicant who was given the job was more qualified. Again, Boyle completely disregarded the magistrate’s conclusion that controlling Fourth Circuit precedent did not, as the defendant claimed, require a plaintiff to prove she was more qualified than other candidates.

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